

Bayesian networks for scenario analysis of nuclear waste repositories



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Background

- Deep geological disposal of nuclear waste
- For licensing a repository, safety assessment
- Large aleatory uncertainty about the evolution of the disposal system
- Typically addressed by scenario analysis



Safety ?

Scenario Analysis

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario ...

Scenario n


Motivation

- Spent-nuclear-fuel repository at Olkiluoto, Finland
- Emphasis on comprehensiveness
- TURMET project objectives:
 - Systematize scenario analysis for nuclear waste repositories
 - Bring methodological advancements to help achieve comprehensiveness in scenario analysis



Scenario analysis process

- Structure of the process:
 - Scenario development
 - Identification of the Features, Events & Processes (FEPs)
 - System model of the disposal system
 - Scenario generation
 - Consequence analysis
- Approaches to scenario generation:
 - Pluralistic
 - Probabilistic



Challenges

- Methodological challenges in scenario analysis:

1


Building a **system model** as a framework for scenario generation

2

Achieving **comprehensiveness**

3

Treating the **epistemic uncertainties**



FEPs and safety target

- Set of nodes – FEPs and safety target – and arcs

- Random variables with discrete states $z^i \in S^i$

$$x^{d_{shear}} \in X^{d_{shear}} = [0, 300 \text{ cm}]$$

$$Z^{d_{shear}} = z_1^{d_{shear}} \Leftrightarrow X^{d_{shear}} = x^{d_{shear}} \in [0, 100 \text{ cm}]$$


- State probabilities:

- Independent nodes → Unconditional $p_{z^i}^i$
- Dependent nodes → Conditional $p_{z^i|z_-^i}^i$

Ice sheet		
z_1^e [0 – 0.7 km)	z_2^e [0.7 km – 1.3 km)	z_3^e [1.3 km – 2 km)
0.56	0.28	0.16

Ice sheet	Fracture displacement		
	$z_1^{d_{shear}}$ [0 – 100 cm)	$z_2^{d_{shear}}$ [100 cm – 200 cm)	$z_3^{d_{shear}}$ [200 cm – 300 cm)
z_1^e	0.91	0.06	0.03
z_2^e	0.49	0.39	0.12
z_3^e	0.02	0.05	0.93

FEPs



Safety target


Scenarios and subscenarios

- A scenario is a combination of FEP states

$$\mathbf{z} = \left(z^1, \dots, z^{n_{FEP}} \right)$$

- For a dependent node, a subscenario is a combination of states of its parents

$$\mathbf{z}_-^i = \left\{ z^j \right\}, \quad \forall j \in \mathbb{V}_-^i, \quad i \in \mathbb{V}^D$$



Safety

- State of the safety target indicating *failure*
- Total *failure probability* of the disposal system

$$p_{fail}(\mathbf{p}) = \underbrace{\sum_{z \in S^z}}_{\text{aggregate over all scenarios}} \underbrace{\prod_{i \in V^I} p_{z \perp i}^i \cdot \prod_{j \in V^D \setminus C} p_{z \perp i | z \perp V_-^i}^i \cdot p_{z_{fail}^C | z \perp V_-^C}^C}_{\text{joint probability of scenario } z \text{ and failure state}}$$

aggregate over
all scenarios


joint probability of
scenario z and failure state



Propagation

- Safety: $p_{fail}(\mathbf{p}) < \varepsilon_{fail}$


FEPs



Expert judgment

- At a given node, set of experts
- Suppose one is estimating $p_{z^i}^i$
- For the state-probability vector, multiple experts' beliefs
- Feasible region for the state probabilities:
 - Convex combination of experts' beliefs

$$\mathbb{P}^i = \left\{ \mathbf{p}^i = (p_{z_1^i}^i, \dots, p_{z_{N_i}^i}^i) : \mathbf{p}^i = \sum_{b^i \in \mathcal{B}^i} w_{b^i} \mathbf{p}^i(b^i), w_{b^i} \geq 0, \sum_{b^i \in \mathcal{B}^i} w_{b^i} = 1 \right\}$$




Simulations

- Relationship between the continuous values of a node and of its parents

$$x^i = \phi^i \left(\mathbf{x}_-, \theta^i \right)$$

- Suppose one is estimating $p_{z^i|z_-^i}^{i|V_-^i}$
- Repeated Monte Carlo sampling
- Feasible region for the state probabilities:
 - Belong to their intervals
 - Sum up to one




$$x^i \in \mathbb{X}^i = [a_i, b_i]$$

$$\mathbf{x}_-^i \in \mathbb{X}_-^i = \mathbb{X}_{j \in V_-^i} [a_j, b_j], \quad \theta^i \in \Theta^i$$


$$\phi^i : (\mathbb{X}_-^i \times \Theta^i) \rightarrow \mathbb{X}^i$$

$$|\Theta^i| = 1$$




Failure-probability interval

- Optimization to estimate bounds to the failure probability
- Customized algorithm: simplex + reduced gradients
- Thread expert judgment & simulations – failure-probability interval



Estimation of the failure-probability interval		
Bound	Lower	Upper
Objective function	$\min_p p_{fail}(p)$	$\max_p p_{fail}(p)$
Constraints	$p^i \in P^i$	$\forall i \in V^I$
	$p^{i z_-^i} \in P^{i z_-^i}$	$\forall z_-^i \in S_-^i, \forall i \in V^D$



Conclusiveness & comprehensiveness


- It can be challenging to assess safety
- The failure-probability interval is conclusive if it lies either:
 - entirely below the maximum acceptable threshold - Safe
 - entirely above the maximum acceptable threshold - Unsafe
- Comprehensiveness:

$$\mathbb{P} : \left(\forall \mathbf{p} \in \mathbb{P} \Rightarrow p_{fail}(\mathbf{p}) < \varepsilon_{fail} \right) \vee \left(\forall \mathbf{p} \in \mathbb{P} \Rightarrow p_{fail}(\mathbf{p}) \geq \varepsilon_{fail} \right)$$


$$P^i, \forall i \in V^1$$

$$P^{j|z^j}, \forall z^j_- \in S^j_-, \forall j \in V^D$$

$$P = \left(\bigtimes_{i \in V^1} P^i \right) \times \left(\bigtimes_{j \in V^D, z^j_- \in S^j_-} P^{j|z^j_-} \right)$$



p_{fail}




Comprehensiveness & simulations

- Achieving comprehensiveness can be challenging if there are limits to the number of simulations
- For instance, if the subscenarios to be simulated are sampled randomly:
 - few simulations for all subscenarios
 - large Monte Carlo error
 - wide state-probability intervals
 - wide, possibly nonconclusive, failure-probability interval
- Can simulations be performed for a restricted set of responsibly selected subscenarios?
- For instance, identified by risk-importance measures


$$\hat{\sigma}_{h,k} = \sqrt{\frac{\hat{p}_{z_h^i|z_{-,k}^i}^{i|V_-^i} \cdot \left(1 - \hat{p}_{z_h^i|z_{-,k}^i}^{i|V_-^i}\right)}{N_{s,k} - 1}}$$

Subscenarios		Simulations
Ice sheet	Fracture displacement	
z_1^1	z_1^2	11
z_2^1	z_1^2	12
z_3^1	z_1^2	15
z_1^1	z_2^2	7
z_2^1	z_2^2	11
z_3^1	z_2^2	8
z_1^1	z_3^2	13
z_2^1	z_3^2	13
z_3^1	z_3^2	10
Total		100




Addressing challenges in scenario analysis

- Recall the methodological challenges in scenario analysis:



Comparison to former approaches

- Pluralistic
 - Scenarios selected by judgment
 - Representative/illustrative of the future
- Here, probabilistic scenario analysis



- Probabilistic (e.g., Yucca Mountain)
 - Rigorous mathematical framework
 - Great computational availability
 - Large sample from initial nodes, then simulations in cascade
- Here, less computational availability:
 - integrate expert judgments and simulations
 - identify the regions of the probability space (subscenarios) to be analyzed

