Title: Management of regional fisheries organisations: An application of the Shapley value

Author: Marko Lindroos

Date: November 30, 1998

Status: Systems Analysis Laboratory Research Reports, A76, November 1998.


Keywords: Coalitions, cooperative games, high seas fisheries, international environmental negotiations, Shapley value, straddling and highly migratory fish stocks

 In this paper, we examine a game theoretic setting in which four countries have established a regional organisation for the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks as recommended by the United Nations Convention. These countries consist of two coastal states and two distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation. We are specifically interested in the effect of possible coalition restrictions on these shares. According to our results the distant water fishing nations, by refusing to join with the coastal states, can improve their negotiation position if their fishing costs are high. In addition, we are also allowing for unlimited number of fishing nations in the regional fisheries organisation. The veto players always receive an equal share of the benefits and the least efficient country is seen to make no contribution to the cooperative management regime.